SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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COURTS/FREE SPEECH-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST NEED TO MAIN-

INTEGRITY-In re Randolph, 101 N.J. 425, 502
A.2d 533 (1986).
TAIN JUDICIAL

Mrs. Norma Randolph had been actively involved in community affairs for approximately thirty years prior to becoming a
court attendant inJanuary of 1983. 101 N.J. at 428-29, 502 A.2d
at 534-35. Shortly after securing this position, she informed the
Monmouth County trial court administrator of her participation
in a number of community organizations. At that time, she served
on the boards of four public organizations (the Monmouth
County Mental Health Board, the Freehold Borough Municipal
Youth Guidance Council, the Freehold Borough Citizens Participation Committee for HUD, and the Freehold Borough Board of
Assessment) and was an officer of two private organizations (the
NAACP and the United Progressive Homeowners and Taxpayers
Association). Id. at 428, 502 A.2d at 534.
The administrative office of the courts advised Mrs. Randolph that she should dissociate herself from these organizations
because her participation engendered "a significant likelihood of
involvement in political activity." Id. On May 6, 1983, the assignment judge of Monmouth County entered an order requiring
Mrs. Randolph to comply with these restrictions as a condition of
her continued employment as a court attendant. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey subsequently granted a petition for review.
Id. at 429, 502 A.2d at 535.
The supreme court noted that court rule 1:17-1 prohibits all
court personnel from either holding "elective public office" or
engaging in "political activity." Id. at 434-35, 502 A.2d at 538. In
analyzing the claim that the rule violated Mrs. Randolph's first
amendment rights of freedom of speech, expression, and association, the court applied a balancing test by which the rights of the
individual employee were weighed against the governmental interest in an independent judiciary. Id. at 431, 502 A.2d at 536.
The court took into account both the specific forms of expression
involved and the availability of alternative methods of achieving
the state's goal of judicial independence. Id. at 432, 502 A.2d at
537.
The court first emphatically declared that the state possessed
a compelling interest in preserving an independent and impartial
judiciary. Id. at 433, 502 A.2d at 537. It noted that rule 1:17-1

880

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:877

stemmed from the concern that political activism on the part of
court employees would frustrate the judiciary's attempt to maintain the requisite degree of independence and impartiality. Id. at
434-35, 502 A.2d at 538. The supreme court then considered
several alternative interpretations proposed by Mrs. Randolph,
such as applying the rule only to judges or only to "partisan"
political activity. See id. at 436-42, 502 A.2d at 539-42. The court
rejected Mrs. Randolph's first proposal, refusing to limit the application of rule 1:17-1 to employees directly involved in the decision-making process, such as judges. Even the appearance of
bias or impropriety, the majority reasoned, could affect the judiciary's ability to function by lowering the public's confidence in
the court system. Id. at 437-39, 502 A.2d at 539-40. The court
also refused to limit the rule's prohibition to activity on behalf of
a political party. The court noted that "issue activity," as well as
political activity, might weaken the public's perception of the judiciary as an independent entity. Id. at 436-37, 502 A.2d at 539.
In the instant case, the supreme court found that Mrs. Randolph's participation in outside organizations had the potential
to involve her in political conflicts. See id. at 442-50, 502 A.2d at
542-46. Furthermore, her position as a court attendant tended
to create the impression ofjudicial involvement in these conflicts.
Id. at 454, 502 A.2d at 548. Because this could have "a disruptive
effect on the work of the judiciary," the majority held that Mrs.
Randolph could not continue her involvement with these organizations while she served as a court attendant. Id. at 428, 502
A.2d at 534.
Justice Pollock agreed with the majority's determination that
Mrs. Randolph must sever her connections with any public organizations. Id. at 459, 502 A.2d at 551 (Pollock, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In contrast to the majority, however,
he would have permitted her to continue her membership in the
two private associations. Id. at 459- 60, 502 A.2d at 551 (Pollock,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, Justice Pollock recognized that Mrs. Randolph's participation in the
private organizations might someday become pervasive enough
to warrant her resignation from those groups. Id. at 460, 502
A.2d at 551 (Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi criticized
the majority for imposing an inflexible rule that failed to resolve
adequately the conflict between the judiciary's need to maintain

881

SURVEY

19861

integrity and the constitutional rights of individuals. Id. at 47172, 502 A.2d at 558 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). She stated that
the court had failed to consider "the least intrusive means to
achieve the intent of Rule 1:17-1." Id. at 472, 502 A.2d at 558
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi pointed out that Mrs.
Randolph performed only ministerial tasks in the courtroom. In
addition, she questioned whether Mrs. Randolph's activities
should be as severely restricted as those ofjudges. Id. at 468-69,
502 A.2d at 556-57 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Throughout its decision, the supreme court emphasized the
compelling interest of the state in the integrity of the judicial system. In order to protect that interest, the court not only affirmed
that the first amendment rights of judicial employees may be restricted, but made clear that these employees may engage in only
the most minimal level of political activity or expression. Fortunately, in so deciding, the court did not adopt a blanket rule or
absolute ban on the exercise of these constitutional rights. Instead, it adopted a balancing test that was fair and reasonable as
formulated. The application of this test in the instant case, however, was overly restrictive, given the limited role of the court
employee and the fundamental nature of the rights at stake. If
the court continues to apply this test in the future, it must give
adequate consideration to these important factors.
Dominick Bratti

INSURANCE-POLICY CONTAINING AUTOMATIC PREMIUM LOAN
PROVISION

REMAINS

EFFECTIVE

ABSENT

TION-Meier v. New Jersey Life Insurance Co.,

PROPER

REVOCA-

101 N.J. 597, 503

A.2d 862 (1986).
In 1977, the New Jersey Life Insurance Company (NJL) issued two $250,000 policies on the life of Frank Meier. 101 NJ.
at 603, 503 A.2d at 864. The policies contained an automatic
premium loan (APL) clause, which provided that upon default of
a payment, NJL would "automatically [pay] the amount due out
of the loan or cash value of the policy." Id., 503 A.2d at 865. Mr.
Meier discontinued the premium payments in August of 1980,
when his insurance consultants recommended that he replace the

NJL policies with the less expensive policies of another company.
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Id. at 604, 503 A.2d at 865. NJL then activated the APL provision. One of the policies lapsed because the cash value was insufficient to cover the August 11th premium. Id. at 604 n.5, 503
A.2d at 865 n.5. With respect to the second policy, however, NJL
paid the next two consecutive premiums on August 11, 1980 and
December 11, 1980. The next quarterly payment was due on
February 11, 1981. The policy, however, provided for a thirtyday grace period, which extended the time for payment until
March 14, 1981. Id. at 604, 503 A.2d at 865.
Sometime during March of 198 1, June Meier, the beneficiary
and designated owner of the NJL policy issued to her husband,
"commenced steps to surrender [the policy] for its cash value."
Id. On March 13, 1981, NJL sent Mrs. Meier a cash-surrender
form and a letter instructing her to sign the form and return it
with the policy. Id. at 605, 503 A.2d at 865. NJL acknowledged
receipt of the signed cash-surrender form on March 27, 1981,
but again requested that Mrs. Meier forward the policy or, in the
alternative, execute a Lost Policy Agreement. Id. at 605-06, 503
A.2d at 866.
On April 13, 1981, Frank Meier died. Mrs. Meier submitted
a Lost Policy Agreement to NJL along with her claim for the face
value of the policy. Id. at 606, 503 A.2d at 866. Litigation ensued to determine whether the NJL policy had lapsed and, if so,
whether the lapse was attributable to (1) the failure of NJL to
institute the APL provision on March 14, 1981, (2) an effective
surrender of the policy, or (3) a "mutual consent" termination of
the policy. Id. at 602, 503 A.2d at 864.
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and awarded the beneficiaries of the NJL policy its full
face value plus prejudgment interest. Id. at 602-03, 503 A.2d at
864. A majority of the appellate division affirmed, holding that
the policy was in force at the time of Meier's death. A dissenting
judge, however, concluded that the policy had justifiably lapsed
because of nonpayment of premiums, and as a result, the defendant was eligible to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
See id. at 606-07, 503 A.2d at 866. Subsequently, a majority of
the supreme court affirmed the decision of the appellate division.
Id. at 623, 503 A.2d at 875.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, first addressed
NJL's contention that under its internal procedures, the policy
had lapsed because APL provisions were not processed "until fifteen days after the expiration of the grace period." Id. at 609,
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503 A.2d at 868. The court dismissed the assertion, emphasizing
that an insurance company's failure to activate the APL provision
on time cannot be used to penalize the insured. Id. In the absence of proper notice by the insured revoking the APL provision, NJL was required to pay the premium before the expiration
of the grace period, and therefore, the policy could not lapse as a
result of nonpayment of premiums. Id. at 611, 503 A.2d at 869.
In determining whether Mrs. Meier's submission of the cashsurrender form consituted a surrender of the policy within the
terms of the contract, the court deemed the language of the insurance agreement ambiguous because it did not explicitly state
whether a return of the policy by physical delivery was a prerequisite to an effective surrender. Id. at 616, 503 A.2d at 872. Justice Garibaldi noted that the doctrine of reasonable expectations
mandates that ambiguous language be construed in favor of the
insured. Id. at 612-13, 503 A.2d at 869-70. Therefore, she concluded that the NJL policy had not been effectively surrendered.
Id. at 617-18, 503 A.2d at 872-73.
Finally, the court considered whether the policy had been
terminated through the mutual consent of the parties. See id. at
618-21, 503 A.2d at 873-74. Justice Garibaldi admonished that
in the absence of a provision in the contract providing for unilateral cancellation of the policy by the insured, mutual consent of
the parties was the only means by which cancellation of the policy
could be validly effectuated. Id. at 619, 503 A.2d at 873. Under
the facts at bar, Justice Garibaldi observed that mutual consent
could only be found if Mrs. Meier had satisfied the condition for
termination imposed by NJL--physical return of the policy. Because the policy was never returned, the court concluded that
"there was no meeting of the minds," and consequently, "there
was no termination of the contract by mutual consent." Id. at
621, 503 A.2d at 874. The majority therefore held that the NJL
policy was in effect at the time of Frank Meier's death. Id. at 622,
503 A.2d at 875.
In a dissent, Justice Clifford concluded that Mrs. Meier had
effectively surrendered the NJL policy when she tendered the
cash-surrender form. Id. at 626-27, 503 A.2d at 877 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). He contended that the intent of the parties must
control and that the conduct of the policyholder best reveals his
intent. Id. at 623-24, 503 A.2d at 875 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
He therefore asked, "How more plainly could [Mrs. Meier] express her earnest wish" to terminate the policy than through her
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execution of the cash-surrender form? Id. at 628, 503 A.2d at
878 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority, Justice Clifford
observed that physical delivery was "a condition precedent to
payment" of the policy rather than a condition precedent to an
effective surrender. Id.
The Meier controversy underscores the necessity for precise
draftsmanship of insurance contracts. The possibility of a court
resorting to the legal catchall of resolving an ambiguity in favor
of the insured can be eliminated by precise, explicit language in
the agreement. As evidenced by the majority's decision, an APL
provision can be applied to enable an insured who blatantly
manifests his intent to surrender a policy to recover later under
that same policy. Insurance companies offering the APL option,
however, can protect their interests by carefully prescribing policy surrender procedures in the insurance contract.
Mark A. Lustbader

FAMILY

LAW-PRIVATE

AGREEMENTS

MUST

BE

CONSIDERED,

THOUGH THEY MAY BE REJECTED, IN JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF CUSTODY-WiSt v. Wist, 101 N.J. 509, 503 A.2d 281

(1986).
Anne Wist, the plaintiff, and George Wist, her husband and
the defendant in a divorce action, entered into an agreement
concerning the custody of their children. 101 N.J. at 510, 503
A.2d at 281. According to the agreement, which the parties
termed a "joint custody" arrangement, the children would live
with the plaintiff, and the husband would have certain visitation
rights, including weekends and alternate holidays. The agreement further provided that the husband was to be granted access
to the children's school reports, that he was to be consulted with
regard to medical treatment, and that he was to be given the right
of first refusal as a babysitter. Id. at 510, 503 A.2d at 281-82. As
later noted by the majority in the appellate division, the agreement was the " 'typical one of custody in one parent, the mother,
with liberal visitation and participation

. . .

by the other parent,

the father,' " and after a hearing on the matter, it was expressly
approved by the trial court. Id. at 510, 503 A.2d at 282. Because
of a dispute between the parties regarding the proper form of
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judgment, however, the lower court subsequently rejected the arrangement and ordered a trial on all the issues, including custody
of the children. The trial court ultimately decided that the husband should have custody of the children, and absolutely no
weight was accorded to the parties' prior agreement because the
court did not view it as being either final or conclusive. Id. at
511, 503 A.2d at 282.
Finding the custody trial unwarranted, a majority of the appellate division held that the comprehensive nature of the agreement and its preliminary approval by the trial court "amounted,
as a matter of law, to a final judgment for custody." Id. Any disputed matters, the majority held, could have been resolved by
the trial court, and the mere disagreement as to the form ofjudgment was irrelevant. The dissent, on the other hand, found the
trial court's rejection of the agreement proper. It stressed the
fact that although the agreement explicitly provided forjoint custody, there were disputes with respect to which parent would
make "day-to-day" decisions. As a consequence, the dissent concluded that an agreement had not been reached. Id.
In a per curiam opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
modified the decision of the appellate division, remanding the
matter for a new trial on the custody issue. Id. at 514, 503 A.2d
at 284. Unlike the dissenting judge in the appellate division, the
supreme court believed that some deference should have been
given by the trial court to the parties' agreement, despite the fact
that disputes existed regarding certain material issues. See id. at
512, 503 A.2d at 282. The court also disagreed with the appellate division majority, however, and refused to hold that the
agreement could be deemed the final judgment. Id. at 511-12,
503 A.2d at 282. According to the supreme court, the trial court
was required to consider the agreement and to accord it only as
much weight as the situation warranted. Id. at 513, 503 A.2d at
283. After considering the custody arrangement and the attendant circumstances, the trial judge then could either resolve the
disputed matters, try them, or reject the entire agreement. Id. at
512, 503 A.2d at 282-83. In exercising its discretion, the trial
court should determine whether the agreement would "produce
a stable custodial relationship in the best interests of the children," or whether its enforcement would simply encourage further litigation. Id. at 512, 503 A.2d at 283.
The supreme court declared that the following reasons
could lead a trial court to reject such an agreement: "the prob-
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able instability of the custodial arrangements, the insufficiency of
time available to the parties in formulating the stipulation, the
relative importance of the matters remaining in dispute, [and]
the relative incompleteness of the matters covered." Id. at 513,
503 A.2d at 283. Nonetheless, the court observed, these factors
could not justify a complete lack of consideration of the agreement, but could serve only as grounds for rejecting the agreement after a thorough review. Id. Thus, in remanding the case,
the supreme court held that the trial court must hold a plenary
hearing and must consider the custody agreement in addition to
all other relevant factors. The supreme court especially noted
that because of the trial court's original determination, the children had already been in the custody of the father for one-andone-half years. The court declared that this fact should also be
considered on remand in determining what would be in the best
interests of the children. Id. at 513-14, 503 A.2d at 283.
The relevance of a private custody agreement between the
parties to a divorce is indisputable; it constitutes a reference
point from which the court can glean the general intent of the
parties. Typical custody agreements provide for major conditions such as living arrangements, visitation rights, and participation by the noncustodial parent in the daily activities of the child.
It would be unreasonable for a trial court to ignore such an
agreement entirely merely because some aspects of it are later
disputed. The decision of the supreme court, which requires
consideration of pretrial custody arrangements while allowing
their rejection in certain circumstances, achieves the proper balance. The opinion directs the state's trial courts to respect the
intent of the parties, while at the same time permitting a review
of all the extrinsic factors involved.
Betty Ann Babjak

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-AGENCY

REGULATIONS

PROVIDING

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ARE A PREREQUISITE FOR DEBAR-

RING CORPORATE OFFICERS UNDER NEW JERSEY'S PREVAILING
WAGE AcT-Department of Labor v. Titan Construction Co., 102

N.J. 1, 504 A.2d 7 (1985).
The New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act requires that workmen
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who are employed on public-works projects be paid at least the
prevailing wage, as determined by local collective bargaining
agreements. Those contractors who fail to meet this requirement may be debarred from entering into public-works contracts
for a period of three years. 102 N.J. at 4, 504 A.2d at 8. In October of 1982, the Titan Construction Company entered into a
public-works contract with the Middletown Township Board of
Education. A subsequent investigation by the New Jersey Department of Labor revealed that Titan had failed to pay the required wage to eight of its workmen, three of whom were Titan's
sole owners and officers. Titan and its principals were notified of
their violations and warned that if they did not file a request for a
hearing within twenty days, they would be placed on a list of
debarred contractors. Id. at 4-5, 504 A.2d at 8-9.
At a hearing before an administrative law judge, Titan conceded that its principals had not been paid the prevailing rate,
but argued that this was not required by the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act. Despite Titan's contention, the administrative law
judge granted the Department of Labor's motion for summary
judgment and debarred both the company and its officers from
public contracting work. Id. at 5, 504 A.2d at 9. Both the Department of Labor and the appellate division denied motions for
a stay of debarment pending an appeal by Titan. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, granted the stay, and instructed the appellate division to expedite its determination of the appeal. Id. at
6, 504 A.2d at 9.
In a per curiam opinion, the appellate division summarily affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge, while noting
that another panel of the appellate division had arrived at a different conclusion in Department of Labor v. Berlanti, 196 NJ. Super.

122, 481 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984). The supreme court then
granted certification in order to determine the following issues:
(1) whether the term "workman" in the New Jersey Prevailing
Wage Act should be construed to exclude corporate stockholders
who perform labor on public-works projects; (2) whether the
Commissioner of Labor has the authority to debar corporate officers when a corporation violates the Act; and (3) whether the
Department of Labor properly exercised its authority in this case.
Titan Construction, 102 N.J. at 8, 12, 504 A.2d at 10, 13.
In regard to the first issue, Justice Stein, writing for a unanimous court, maintained that construing the statute to exclude
corporate stockholders would be a disservice to "both the letter
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and purpose of the Act." Id. at 9, 504 A.2d at 11. Such a holding, he stated, would encourage stock-ownership schemes
designed to frustrate the purpose and hinder the implementation
of the Act. Consequently, the court held that the prevailing wage
requirement applied to all workers, including stockholders of the
offending corporation. Id.
Turning to the second issue, the court admitted that the language of the Act was ambiguous regarding the Commissioner's
authority to debar individual corporate officers. Nevertheless,
the court stated that such a power could be inferred from the
legislative intent behind the statute. Id. at 10, 504 A.2d at 12.
Justice Stein declared that the public policy expressed in the Act
was " 'to protect [employees] as well as their employers from the
effects of serious and unfair competition' that result from inadequate wages." Id. at 11, 504 A.2d at 12 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:11-56.25 (West 1965)). He further noted that debarment
serves as a deterrent in order to ensure that contractors pay the
required wages. Justice Stein reasoned that this deterrent effect
would be extinguished if the Commissioner was authorized to debar only the corporate entity because the corporate officers responsible for the violations could simply start new enterprises.
Thus, the court held that the Commissioner could debar individual corporate officers under the Act. Id., 504 A.2d at 12-13.
Although it resolved the first two issues in favor of the Department of Labor, the court refused to hold that the debarment
of Titan's officers in this case was valid. Id. at 18, 504 A.2d at 17.
Justice Stein noted that the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act itself
set no standards for debarring corporate officers. As a result, he
maintained that "basic fairness" required the Commissioner of
Labor to establish guidelines and regulations if he intended as a
rule to debar the officers of corporations found guilty of violating
the Act. Because one or more officers in such a corporation
could be free from responsibility for the violations, these officers
must be afforded procedural safeguards such as "notice, [a] hearing, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross examine
an adverse witness." Id. at 17, 504 A.2d at 16. Thus, the court
concluded that the Department of Labor had improperly exercised its authority because it had failed to define the conduct that
would result in individual debarment. See id. at 17-18, 504 A.2d
at 16-17.
In Titan Construction, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that its conclusion was "an exception to the general rule that
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courts normally should defer to an agency's discretion in determining the appropriate method of implementing its statutory responsibilities." Id. at 18, 504 A.2d at 16. In this instance,
however, the court declined to defer to the agency because the
"lack of essential substantive standards and procedural safeguards" amounted to an abuse of its discretion. Id., 504 A.2d at
17. Nevertheless, the court upheld the ruling that corporate officers who perform labor on public-works projects must be paid
the prevailing wage and that the Commissioner of Labor has the
authority to debar those corporate officers who violate the Act.
Id. at 9, 11, 504 A.2d at 11, 13. In so doing, the court clarified
the scope of the Act in an effort to deter future violations by corporate officers and served notice that an agency's discretion is
not unlimited and must be exercised in accordance with fundamental principles of due process.
Edward T. Kole

STATE

CONTRACTS-COMMISSIONS-INDEPENDENT

REAL

Es-

TATE BROKER NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION ABSENT SHOWING OF CONTINUITY

IN RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTRACTOR-

SamuelJ Plumeri Realty Co. v. Capital Place Urban Renewal Associates, 101 N.J. 13, 499 A.2d 1356 (1985).
In July of 1971, Gladstone Associates published a report discussing the feasibility of developing Capital Plaza Tower I (Capital Plaza), an office building owned by Capital Place Urban
Renewal Associates (Capital Place) and located two blocks from
the NewJersey State Capitol Building. The report indicated that
Capital Plaza could be successfully developed if the State of New
Jersey became the principal tenant. On his own initiative, Sa-

muel J. Plumeri, president of the Plumeri Realty Company, succeeded in interesting Eugene M. Grant, an accomplished real
estate developer, in the project. In March of 1972, Grant was

given an exclusive, four-month option to undertake the development. 101 N.J. at 16, 499 A.2d at 1357.
Realizing that the project's success required that the state be
a principal tenant, Grant depended on Plumeri for introductions
to the appropriate state officials, with whom he could discuss
leasing the office space in his proposed building. Id. at 16-17,
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499 A.2d at 1358. On September 21st, Grant secured a written
commitment that the state would lease the office space. Id. at 17,
499 A.2d at 1358. On June 5, 1973, Grant and Capital Place, the
owner of Capital Plaza, agreed to pay Plumeri $346,666.65 as a
commission on condition that the state lease and "pay rent for
approximately 100,000 square feet of office space." Id. Plumeri
continued to assist Grant in procuring tenants until 1979. Id. at
18, 499 A.2d at 1358.
After the change in the state government's administration in
1974, Plumeri's right to receive the agreed-upon commission was
challenged. Frank M. Papale, Jr., the director of the Division of
Purchase and Property, refused to pay the commission because it
"appeared 'to be violative of the provisions set forth in N.J.S.A.
52:34-15.' " Id. at 17, 499 A.2d at 1358. When the state and Capital Plaza entered into a twenty-five-year lease on September 12,
1975, Papale placed funds in escrow pending an adjudication of
Plumeri's right to the commission. Plumeri then sued Grant and
the state in order to obtain the commission. Id. at 18, 499 A.2d
at 1358.
At trial, the jury found that although Plumeri had earned the
commission, "he was not entitled to it because he was not 'a bona
fide established commercial or selling agency maintained by the
developer for the purpose of securing business in addition to this
one State lease.' " Id. at 18, 499 A.2d at 1359. On appeal, the
appellate division reversed, finding "that Plumeri was entitled to
his commission absent proof that he had engaged in influencepeddling." Id. at 19, 499 A.2d at 1359. Thereafter, the state petitioned for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court in order
to determine whether the requirement set forth in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:34-15 (West 1986) that the broker be "maintained by
the contractor" had been satisfied. Plumeri Realty, 101 N.J. at 15,
499 A.2d at 1357. The supreme court reversed the appellate division's decision, ruling that Plumeri had not been "maintained"
by the developer within the meaning of the statute. Hence, the
court held that awarding him a commission would violate state
law. Id. at 15, 499 A.2d at 1357.
Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, examined the language of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-15 (West 1986), which disallows
the payment of commissions to agents employed under state contracts exceeding $2500. He noted that the statute provides an
exception for those "bona fide" agents "maintained by the contractor for the purpose of securing business." Plumeri Realty, 101
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N.J. at 19, 499 A.2d at 1359 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-15
(West 1986)). Justice Pollock found that the legislative history
did not reveal the meaning of the phrase "maintained by the contractor," and he observed that no reported New Jersey decision
had construed the relevant statutory language. Id. at 21, 499
A.2d at 1360.
The majority noted that the only case that had discussed the
statute, State v. Arnold Constable Corp., 138 NJ. Super. 551, 351
A.2d 771 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 518, 361 A.2d 533
(1976), had held that a contingent commission was impermissible
when the broker's employment was based solely on his or her
accessibility to state officials. Plumeri Realty, 101 N.J. at 20, 499
A.2d at 1359. In Plumeri Realty, the state had introduced no
proofs on that issue; therefore, the main concern was whether
the broker had engaged in a "solitary transaction" with the contractor. See id., 499 A.2d at 1360.
In an analysis of Federal law, the supreme court determined
that the Federal courts had construed a similar United States statute to require an agent to hold "a continuing relationship with a
contractor" in order to be entitled to a contingent commission.
Id. at 21, 499 A.2d at 1360. Applying that standard, the court
concluded that the requisite continuity could be demonstrated by
showing "a prior relationship or . . . an intent to engage in a

future course of dealings." Id. at 22, 499 A.2d at 1360. Justice
Pollock observed that Plumeri's relationship with Grant satisfied
neither of these characteristics. Thus, the majority of the
supreme court held that Plumeri had not been "maintained" by
Grant within the statutory meaning. Furthermore, because the
main objective of Plumeri's employment was to ensure that the
state became a tenant in Capital Plaza, the fact that Plumeri had
attempted to procure other tenants was insufficient to entitle him
to a commission. Id. Acknowledging that the denial of Plumeri's
commission seemed "harsh," the court reasoned that the requirement of a continuing relationship between a contractor and
a broker was necessary to serve the "legitimate legislative purpose [of] forestalling influencing peddling." Id., 499 A.2d at
1361.
In dissent, Justices Clifford, Garibaldi, and Stein agreed with
the majority's reading of the legislative purpose underlying the
statute, but disagreed that the denial of Plumeri's commission
would further that purpose. Relying on the Arnold Constable case,
they reasoned that a broker's entitlement to a commission should
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be determined by balancing all of the relevant factors in order to
decide whether the "inherent tendency" of the promised commission was to promote either corruption or the exertion of improper influence over public officials. Id. at 23, 499 A.2d at 1361
(Clifford, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority's
failure to apply that standard indicated that the court had effectively overruled the Arnold Constable case. Id. at 22, 499 A.2d at
1361 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Under the Arnold Constable approach, the dissent decided that
awarding the commission to Plumeri would not be "incompatible
with the statute." Id. at 23, 499 A.2d at 1361 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Reviewing the evidence, the dissent observed that
Plumeri had not merely served as an influence peddler; rather, he
had been "primarily responsible" for developing the project, and
it was through his arrangements that Grant had procured the
state as a tenant. Id. Based on the record, the dissent concluded
that Plumeri's relationship with Grant had extended over several
years and that his role in securing the state lease was "minor" in
comparison with his other contributions to the project. Id. at 24,
499 A.2d at 1361 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
In deciding that the Arnold Constable case did not pertain to
the issue before it, the Plumeri Realty court avoided the necessity
of applying that decision's balancing test, a method recommended by the dissent. Instead, the majority turned to the Federal standard for help in construing the relevant statutory phrase
"maintained by the contractor," and this resulted in a strict application of the statute. Under the court's "per se" rule, a broker is
presumed to be an "influence peddler" and hence is denied a
commission whenever he or she has neither a past relationship
nor a future intention to deal with the contractor. Although such
a rule may provide a convenient means of determining whether a
broker is acting as an influence peddler, it may also compel many
independent, bona fide brokers to shift their business from the
public sector to the private sector.
Joan M. Neri

CIVIL PROCEDURE-ENTRY OF
MENT ON PLAINTIFF'S
UNLESS
AND
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HE

JUDG-

CLAIM WILL REMAIN INTERLOCUTORY

DEMONSTRATES

COMPELLING

JUDGMENT-SUMMARY

NEED TO

INSUBSTANTIAL

COUNTERCLAIM

SECURE JUDGMENT-Halpern

v.

Tannenbaum, 207 N.J. Super. 314, 504 A.2d 141 (Law Div.
1985).
Eli Halpern and several other plaintiffs brought an action
against Philip Tannenbaum and a number of additional defendants, asserting a claim based upon a promissory note. The defendants failed to raise a defense, and the plaintiffs were thus
found to be entitled to summary judgment. 207 NJ. Super. at
316-17, 504 A.2d at 142-43. In a counterclaim based on an unrelated transaction, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs had
failed to effect a prompt return of loan documents. Unlike the
plaintiffs' claim, the counterclaim proved to be an improper subject for summary judgment. The defendants sought to postpone
the entry of a final judgment on the plaintiffs' claim, arguing that
a final judgment should not be entered until the counterclaim
had been adjudicated. In the alternative, they argued that execution on the judgment should be stayed. Id. at 315, 504 A.2d at
142.
This case presented a question of first impression in the New
Jersey courts. Id. at 315-16, 504 A.2d at 142. Applying court
rules 4:46-2 and 4:42-2, the court found that the mere existence
of a counterclaim did not itself bar the imposition of a final summary judgment. Under the rules, should the court certify "that
there is no just reason for delay," entry of such a judgment is
deemed a valid exercise of the court's power. The issue, then,
was whether the court, under the circumstances of this case,
should certify the judgment as final, or whether some other disposition was possible. Id. at 316, 504 A.2d at 142.
Judge Haines noted several considerations bearing on the
answer to this question. On the one hand, a defendant is authorized "to setoff the amount of any recovery" on a counterclaim
against the amount of the plaintiff's judgment. Id. at 317, 504
A.2d at 143. In addition, when a judgment is certified as final,
the forty-five-day period for an appeal begins to run. Judge
Haines pointed out that it would not be "in the interest of the
parties, or the appellate courts, that an appeal be taken in a matter of this kind until all issues have been determined." Id. On
the other hand, when a judgment is not final, or when a stay of
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execution is granted, there is the possibility that the defendants
may dispose of assets, thus making the judgment uncollectible.
Id.
In its search for a middle ground between these contending
interests, the court examined a variety of approaches taken in
other jurisdictions. One approach, originally applied in the Federal courts, distinguished between counterclaims that are compulsory and those that are not, permitting final judgment only in
the latter case. Id. at 318, 504 A.2d at 143. While in New Jersey
"[t]he permissive-mandatory distinction is not controlling in view
of [rule] 4:46-2," the court maintained that it was "entitled to
consideration." Id. at 319, 504 A.2d at 144.
In this case, Judge Haines stated that the counterclaim was
of a mandatory nature because it arose from an ongoing business
relationship among the parties. Furthermore, it was uncertain
whether the amount of recovery on the counterclaim, if successful, would exceed the amount of the plaintiffs' judgment. Because of these considerations, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs' summary judgment should be interlocutory.
In an effort to protect the plaintiffs, however, the court gave
them leave to demonstrate a need to secure their judgment. If
the plaintiffs could show that the amount of recovery on the
counterclaim would be "substantially less than the amount of the
summary judgment," or that the defendants' assets might be dissipated before the counterclaim could be resolved, the court
would consider revising its interlocutory order. Id. at 320, 504
A.2d at 145. In such circumstances, the court could issue a restraining order that would prevent the dissipation of assets, or it
could "make the interlocutory judgment a lien upon" the defendants' real and personal property. Id. at 321, 504 A.2d at 145.
This would make the interlocutory judgment "similar to a final
judgment," without precluding a setoff or making the judgment
appealable. Id.
The court in Halpern v. Tannenbaum arrived at a construction
of New Jersey's court rules that does justice to the language of
those rules, protects the interests of the parties, and preserves
the integrity of the judiciary. A major advantage of this decision
is that it will prevent untimely appeals. A potential problem,
however, which may cast a shadow upon the court's approach, is
that it places a burden on the plaintiff to come forward with evidence or information that he may not possess. In addition, it assumes that actions taken by the court to modify an interlocutory
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judgment will have the intended effect. Without doubt, the situation presented by this case will arise again, and the court's ruling
will be tested by repeated practical application. Once the scope
of the decision has been more completely defined, an addition to
the court rules may be necessary.
Jean L. Meyer

CRIMINAL

LAW-MEDICAL

NECESSITY

Is

NOT A DEFENSE TO

NARCOTICS POSSESSION UNLESS THE DRUG IS

OBTAINED IN

COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY GUIDELINES-State v. Tate, 102

NJ. 64, 505 A.2d 941 (1986).
On March 29, 1983, acting on an informant's tip, the

Manalapan police searched the home of Michael Tate, a
quadriplegic, pursuant to a valid search warrant. This search re-

vealed "a large amount of marijuana, a scale, paraphernalia, and
money." 102 N.J. at 67, 505 A.2d at 942. Subsequently, Tate
was charged with possession of more than twenty-five grams of
marijuana. Tate's attorney notified the county prosecutor that he
would rely upon the defense of "justification" premised on
"medical necessity" at Tate's trial. Tate contended that he used
the marijuana to ease the spastic contractions he regularly suffered as a quadriplegic and that no other prescription drug afforded him the same relief. Id. The state moved to strike Tate's
defense, arguing that his claim of "medical necessity" did not satisfy the definition of justification contained in the relevant New
Jersey statute. Id. at 67-68, 505 A.2d at 942.
The trial court denied the motion to strike the justification
defense, ruling that the circumstances of the present case allowed
Tate to assert the defense of necessity. The appellate division,
with one judge dissenting, affirmed the lower court's ruling. After an appeal by the state, the supreme court reversed. Id. at 67,

505 A.2d at 942.
Justice Clifford, writing for the majority, observed that the
legislature, by enacting the New Jersey Penal Code, had attempted to limit the courts' wide discretion and codify the crimi-

nal law. Thus, Justice Clifford maintained, the legislature had
appropriated the responsibility "for defining the scope of former
common-law defenses," including necessity. Id. at 68-69, 505
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A.2d at 943. The majority noted that the relevant statute contains three limitations governing the defense of necessity. First,
conduct is justifiable under the section only to the extent that it is
permitted by law. Second, the defense is not available when the
Code or another statutory provision defining the substantive
crime provides an exception or defense applicable to the specific
situation. Finally, the defense is not available if it is clear that the
legislature intended to preclude a claim of justification. See id. at
69-70, 505 A.2d at 944 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2(a) (West
1982)).
Based on these standards, the court concluded that the necessity defense was unavailable to Tate in this case. Justice Clifford noted that the possession of marijuana was clearly "not
'permitted by law.' " Id. at 70, 505 A.2d at 944. Furthermore, he
pointed out that three specific provisions in title 24 of the New
Jersey statutes demonstrate that the legislature had rejected the
possibility that marijuana had some medical use. For example,
Justice Clifford stressed that possession of a controlled dangerous substance is not a crime if the drug was obtained under " 'a
valid prescription or order from a practitioner.' " Id. at 71, 505

A.2d at 944-45 (quoting N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 24:21-20(a) (West

Cum. Supp. 1986-1987)). The court reasoned that because Tate
lacked the required prescription, he could not resort to the statutory exception. Id.
The court also noted that the state had recognized some potentially beneficial medical uses for marijuana when it had enacted the Controlled Dangerous Substances Therapeutic
Research Act (TRA). See id. at 72, 505 A.2d at 945 (citing NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2L-1 to -9 (West Cum. Supp. 1986-1987)).Justice Clifford observed that the TRA permits the use of marijuana
for the purposes of scientific study and experimentation. Because
Tate had not applied under the TRA for the use of marijuana,
the court held that the Act afforded him no protection. See id. at
74-75, 505 A.2d at 946. Thus,Justice Clifford concluded that the
legislature had contemplated the defense sought by the defendant, had inserted specific provisions covering it, and had made
clear "its intent to exclude the defense except as specifically provided." Id. at 72, 505 A.2d at 945. Additionally, the court maintained that there would be no defense of necessity under the
common law because the defendant would be unable to show the
absence of an available legal alternative to procuring the drug
from an illegal source. Justice Clifford reasoned that Tate could
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have obtained the marijuana under the TRA. Id. at 74-75, 505
A.2d at 946-47.
Justice Handler, joined by Justice Stein, dissented, noting
that the infrequency of the defense and the unusual facts under
which it normally arises require that the courts define and apply
the defense "on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 77, 505 A.2d at 947
(Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the defense
is described only "by its own labels, i.e., 'justification' and 'necessity' "; hence, the legislature clearly intended the defense to retain the broad scope it had been given at common law. Id. at 80,
505 A.2d at 949 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Becasue of the TRA's "extremely limited scope," Justice
Handler rejected the argument that the Act provided a real exception to criminal liability for the use of marijuana. Id. at 85,
505 A.2d at 952 (Handler, J., dissenting). He reasoned that the
majority's analysis of title 24 and the TRA had imposed an unwarranted "interpretive strait-jacket" on the medical-necessity
defense. Id. In addition, Justice Handler suggested that use of a
controlled substance could be medically necessary under certain
circumstances and yet not satisfy the standard of an "accepted
medical use." See id. at 83-84, 505 A.2d at 951 (Handler, J., dissenting). In his view, the defense of medical necessity would be
available if the defendant could demonstrate the following elements: the health-threatening nature of the condition, a high
level of suffering, the absence of some other legal treatment, a
good-faith effort to alleviate the suffering with conventional medical treatment, a lack of contribution to the health-threatening
condition by the defendant's own action, and a resulting benefit
to society. See id. at 90-91, 505 A.2d at 954-55 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler stressed that the defendant must establish these elements through the use of competent expert
testimony. See id. at 91, 505 A.2d at 955 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Garibaldi also dissented, noting that the state's interest in forbidding the use of marijuana would not be furthered by
prohibiting its use in exceptional cases. She reasoned that "exceptional cases" should include cancer victims, quadriplegics,
and multiple sclerosis victims. Id. at 95, 505 A.2d at 957 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Furthermore, she suggested that requiring
a defendant to seek expert medical advice prior to taking the proscribed drug, in addition to the other criteria proposed by Justice
Handler, would reduce the potential abuse of this defense by
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those who use illegal narcotics. Id. at 95, 97, 505 A.2d at 957,
958 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
In Tate, the supreme court correctly noted that the legislature had specifically limited the medical use of marijuana to situations arising under the TRA. To allow the use of marijuana in
other circumstances would open a "Pandora's box" of problems
for police departments already overburdened in their attempts to
enforce our drug laws. Furthermore, if the court permitted the
type of use practiced by Tate, it would give at least implicit approval to the users' suppliers, who usually obtain the drug illegally. See id. at 73, 505 A.2d at 945.
Peter P. Feeley

CIVIL PROCEDURE-STATUTE
TION OF FICTITIOUS PARTY,

OF LIMITATIONS-DESPITE DELESUBSEQUENT

ADDITION OF SPE-

CIFIC DEFENDANT MAY BE ALLOWED TO RELATE BACK TO TIME
OF ORIGINAL COMPLAINT-Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538,

503 A.2d 296 (1986).
On December 1, 1978, Lucrezia Viviano's left hand was mangled when she was unable to withdraw it from a malfunctioning
industrial press. 101 N.J. at 542, 503 A.2d at 298. Immediately
following the accident and without Viviano's knowledge, her employer, Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (CBS), removed a
timer from the press. Three days later, an internal memorandum
identified the timer as the defective component and further identified the Taylor Instrument Company as its manufacturer. Id. at
543-44, 503 A.2d at 298-99. Unaware of these facts, Viviano instituted suit onJuly 2, 1979 against CBS, as well as against a fictitious manufacturer, installer, and distributor of the machine. No
manufacturer of a component part of the machine was named
either specifically or fictitiously. Id. at 542-43, 503 A.2d at 298.
Subsequently, on June 30, 1980, CBS furnished Viviano with
a list identifying several component-part manufacturers. Thereafter, Viviano filed an amended complaint naming A & M Tool &
Die, Inc. as the maker of the press and deleting the fictitiousparty designation. Despite continuing discovery, the internal
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CBS memorandum dated December 4, 1978 was not produced
until the deposition of a CBS vice president on June 2, 1982after both the expiration of the statute of limitations and the deletion of the fictitious-party designation from the original complaint. Id. at 543, 503 A.2d at 299. On July 30, 1982, Viviano
filed another amended complaint naming Sybron, which had acquired the Taylor Instrument Company, as the manufacturer of
the defective timer. Id. at 544-45, 503 A.2d at 299.
The trial court denied the timer manufacturer's motion to
dismiss the cause of action. Applying the discovery rule, the
court determined that Viviano's cause of action against the timer
manufacturer had accrued on June 2, 1982, when the internal
CBS memorandum mentioning the Taylor timers first became
known to the plaintiff. The appellate division reversed with one
dissent, concluding that the discovery rule failed to preserve Viviano's claim, which clearly arose on December 1, 1978. Id. at 545,
503 A.2d at 300. The supreme court, although agreeing that the
discovery rule was inapplicable, nevertheless reversed and relaxed the rule governing fictitious-party procedure in the "interests ofjustice." Id. at 546, 503 A.2d at 300. Thus, the court held
that the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint. Id.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, noted that the
discovery rule, an equitable doctrine created by the courts, provides that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff
knows or reasonably should know that an actionable claim exists.
Id. Observing that Viviano was aware "of facts that equated with
a cause of action" on December 1, 1978, the day of her accident,
the court determined that her cause of action had accrued on that
date and that the statute of limitations had simultaneously begun
to run. Therefore, it held that Viviano could not rely upon the
discovery rule to preserve her belated claim against the timer
manufacturer. Id. at 546-47, 503 A.2d at 300.
Justice Pollock then examined the fictitious-party procedure
authorized by New Jersey's court rules, stating that when the alleged defendant's true identity is not known to the plaintiff, the
rules permit process to " 'issue against the defendant under a fictitious name, stating it to be fictitious and adding an appropriate
description sufficient to identify him.' " Id. at 548, 503 A.2d at
301 (quoting N.J. CT. R. 4:26-4). He further noted that the rule
"expressly contemplates the filing of an amended complaint."
Id. at 552, 503 A.2d at 304.
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Emphasizing the necessity and utility of the fictitious- party
procedure in the context of complex cases involving industrial
machinery, Justice Pollock determined that prior decisions construing rule 4:26-4 had allowed a plaintiff whose timely initial
complaint included an appropriate fictitious-party designation to
amend the complaint and name a specific defendant after the
statute of limitations had run. The amended complaint was then
deemed to relate back to the time of the filing of the initial complaint. Id. at 548-49, 503 A.3d at 301-02. Justice Pollock observed, however, that if the fictitious-party designation were
eliminated, the plaintiff could not thereafter identify a specific
defendant if the period of limitation had lapsed. Id. at 549, 503
A.2d at 302. Because Viviano had amended her complaint to
name the manufacturer of the press and had deleted the corresponding fictitious-party designation, the court concluded that a
strict application of rule 4:26-4 would prevent a subsequent
amendment naming the manufacturer of the component part
from relating back. Id. at 550, 503 A.2d at 302.
Justice Pollock determined, however, that the judiciary possessed the power to relax or to dispense with any court rule when
compliance with it would result in injustice. Id. at 550-51, 503
A.2d at 302-03. Therefore, the court relaxed rule 4:26-4 and
held that the amended complaint naming the manufacturer of the
defective timer related back to the time of filing of the initial
complaint. Justice Pollock reasoned that Viviano would have
named the component-part manufacturer in a timely fashion if
CBS had produced its 1978 internal memorandum in discovery
proceedings during the statutory period of limitation. The court
further noted that the timer manufacturer had not been
prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 556, 503 A.2d at 305-06. Consequently, the court liberally interpreted the fictitious designation
"JOHN DOE COMPANY, Manufacturer of Record Press
Machine" to extend to the manufacturer of the component part.
Justice Pollock cautioned, however, that future plaintiffs injured
in accidents involving industrial machines should designate as
fictitious parties those entities associated with the machine's
component parts. In addition, he observed that the complaint
should specify the causes of action asserted against those defendants. Id. at 555, 503 A.2d at 305.
The Viviano court based its holding upon its conviction that
"concealment and technicality" should not "triumph over the interests ofjustice." Id. at 556, 503 A.2d at 306. The court's deci-

901

SURVEY

1986]

sion, although limited to the facts of the case, provides some
guidance to attorneys representing plaintiffs injured by industrial
machines. Justice Pollock's opinion urges practitioners to designate the manufacturers of a machine's component parts and to
describe the causes of action alleged against these fictitious defendants. Only through such specificity can an injured plaintiff
take full advantage of New Jersey's fictitious-party procedure.
Catherine A. Kiernan

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SENTENCING-DESIGN,
ABILITY,

DETERMINES

UNDER THE GRAVES

WHETHER

A

WEAPON

IS

NOT
A

OPER-

FIREARM

AcT-State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 503

A.2d 849 (1986).
In 1981, Wilford Gantt participated as an unarmed accomplice in an armed robbery. Although his armed companion was
never apprehended and the gun was never recovered, Gantt was
nonetheless convicted of armed robbery. This was his second
conviction under similar circumstances. 101 N.J. at 577, 503
A.2d at 851. Pursuant to the Graves Act, which mandates extended terms of imprisonment for second offenders " 'who used
or possessed a firearm during' " the commission of a crime,
Gantt was sentenced to a twenty-five-year term. Id. at 578-79,
503 A.2d at 851-52 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c) (West
1982)). Additionally, under the same statute, he was sentenced
to a minimum of eight-and-one-third years of parole ineligibility.
Id. at 578, 503 A.2d at 851.
Gantt appealed the trial court's decision on two grounds. He
contended that a Graves Act sentence should not be imposed because he had never been in possession of the gun. In addition,
he argued that an extended sentence was unwarranted because
there was some doubt about the gun's operability. The appellate
division, however, affirmed the trial court's decision on both issues. In rejecting Gantt's contentions, the appellate court emphasized that a weapon need not be operable in order for it to
fall within the Graves Act's definition of a "firearm." Id. at 578,

503 A.2d at 851.

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
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Gantt's petition for certification, limiting its review to the issue of
whether a firearm need be proven operable in order for a Graves
Act sentence to be imposed. Id.
In his majority opinion, Justice O'Hern noted that the
Graves Act had adopted its definition of "firearm" directly from
the state's Gun Control Law. Id. at 582, 503 A.2d at 853 (citing
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1986-1987)).
The court explained that the statute does not define a firearm "in
terms of its capability of discharging a projectile, but in terms of
its design." Id. at 584, 503 A.2d at 854. The court further observed that toy guns and similar devices, unlike real guns, are not
covered under the Graves Act because they are not originally
designed to be lethal weapons. Id. at 584-85, 503 A.2d at 855.
Thus, the court held that proof of operability is not required to
show that a weapon is a "firearm" under the Graves Act. The
only requirement is that the instrument be "designed to deliver a
potentially-lethal projectile and hence 'real.' " Id. at 589, 503
A.2d at 857.
In support of its decision, the majority argued that designating a weapon's operability as an element of proof would create
unnecessary and undesirable problems. Id. at 585-86, 503 A.2d
at 855-56. At best, the court noted, it would result in protracted
inquiries into collateral issues not readily susceptible of proof. Id.
at 586, 503 A.2d at 856. At worst, it would "effectively eliminate
the application of the Graves Act in" those cases in which the
firearm had been discarded or hidden by the defendant. Id. at
585, 503 A.2d at 855. The court stated that the legislature had
never intended that such issues enter into the sentencing process. Id.
Rather, the court opined, a weapon's operability should become an issue only if it relates to the weapon's design. Id. at 590,
503 A.2d at 858. The court declared that if evidence is introduced showing that the weapon's original design was "innocuous" or that the instrument had been altered to the extent that it
had "completely and permanently lost the characteristics of a real
gun," then the trier of fact must "determine whether the State
has sustained its overall burden of establishing . . . that the in-

strument used or possessed was a 'firearm.'" Id. Additionally,
the majority emphasized that an examination of the weapon is
not necessary to establish its authenticity because a gun's original
"design may be inferred from appearance or based on lay testimony." Id. at 589, 503 A.2d at 857.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Handler maintained that a
weapon's operability should be considered an essential element
in defining a firearm for purposes of the Graves Act. He observed
that the element of operability "may be established by direct evidence or evidence founded on reasonable inferences." Id. at 595,
503 A.2d at 860 (Handler, J., concurring). Referring to the concerns expressed by the majority, Justice Handler asserted that the
burden of proving operability would not necessarily compromise
the effectiveness of the Graves Act, even if a weapon were discarded by an offender. He suggested that this could be accomplished by employing a rebuttable presumption of operability in
determining whether a weapon is a "firearm" within the meaning
of the Graves Act. Id. at 596, 503 A.2d at 861 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
In Gantt, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
weapon's operability need not be proven in order for it to fall
within the meaning of "firearm" under the Graves Act. In so
holding, the court demonstrated its continued concern for the
safety of the state's citizens, who have been victimized continually
by armed offenders and their accomplices. By focusing on a
weapon's design, the court substantially strengthened the deterrent effect of the Graves Act. Nevertheless, new issues will be
raised when defendants attempt to prove a weapon's innocuous
or altered design in order to avoid sentencing under the statute.
Alberto Romero

PROPERTY-ZONING--"MOTHER
HOME CREATES MULTI-FAMILY

AND DAUGHTER"

ADDITION TO

DWELLING-Rowatti v. Gonchar,

101 N.J. 46, 500 A.2d 381 (1985).
In 1981, John and Nina Gonchar of Northvale, New Jersey
obtained a permit to build a "mother and daughter" addition to
their home in order to house Mrs. Gonchar's widowed mother.
101 N.J. at 47-48, 500 A.2d at 382. Their neighbor, Carl
Rowatti, advised Mr. Gonchar of his belief that the construction
plans violated local side-yard requirements. After the Gonchars
received a side-yard variance from the Northvale Board of Ad-
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justment, the Rowattis objected further, claiming that the addition violated Northvale's zoning ordinance by creating a multifamily dwelling. Id. at 48, 500 A.2d at 382. At a subsequent
hearing, the board of adjustment concluded that the addition,
which included a separate kitchen, bedroom, living room, bathroom, and entrance, was prohibited by the ordinance. Id. at 4950, 500 A.2d at 383.
Both parties subsequently appealed to the Law Division of
New Jersey Superior Court. The law division affirmed the
board's grant of the variance and held that the addition did not
convert the Gonchars' house into a multi-family dwelling. The
appellate division affirmed the lower court's decision on the variance issue, but reversed the trial judge's conclusion that the
Gonchars' home had remained a single-family structure. Id. at 50,
500 A.2d at 384. The Supreme Court of New Jersey then
granted the Gonchars' petition for certification and affirmed the
appellate division's judgment. Id. at 47, 500 A.2d at 382.
The only issue before the supreme court was the proper interpretation of the term "multi-family dwelling." In deciding this
question, the court first noted that the addition possessed all the
characteristics of a completely self-sufficient apartment. Id. at 51,
500 A.2d at 384. The court then observed that the relevant zoning ordinance defined a multi-family dwelling as a structure
either occupied by or designed for more than a single family. In
addition, the court stated, the ordinance defined family "as one
or more persons 'living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit.' " Id. at 53-54, 500 A.2d at 385-86. Because the
addition constituted an entirely separate dwelling, the court concluded that the building had become a multi-family home. Id. at
53, 500 A.2d at 386. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the opportunity for Mrs. Gonchar's mother "to live and cook separately
from the rest of the family" precluded a finding that the
Gonchars were living together as one family. Indeed, the Court
determined that the Gonchars had "envisioned . . . something

beyond a single housekeeping unit." Id. at 55, 500 A.2d at 386.
In reaching its decision, the court also relied on the factual
findings of the board of adjustment. The court noted that the
board's decision-like that of an administrative tribunal-would
"not be disturbed unless it [was] unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Id. at 52, 500 A.2d at 385. In this case, the court observed, the record contained ample evidence supporting the
board's finding that the Gonchars had changed their home into a
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multi-family residence. Id. Consequently, the court declared
that local interpretations of zoning ordinances "must be accorded great latitude" and affirmed the decisions of the board
and the appellate division. Id. at 55, 500 A.2d at 386. Finally, the
court refused to consider any constitutional issues because the
Gonchars had failed to raise these contentions in the lower
courts or during oral argument. Id. at 55-56, 500 A.2d at 387.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stein asserted that the
Northvale ordinance was "facially inconsistent" because a onefamily dwelling was defined as a house occupied by or designed
for a single family, while a multi-family dwelling was defined as a
house occupied by or designed for more than a single family.
Thus, he observed, a structure built for two families but occupied
by only one would fall within either definition. Id. at 60-61, 500
A.2d at 390 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein maintained that
this lack of clarity raised a significant constitutional issue: the ordinance might be impermissibly vague and thus violative of the
Gonchars' due process rights. Id. at 62-63, 500 A.2d at 391
(Stein, J., dissenting). He would have remanded the case to the
law division for a consideration of the validity of the underlying
zoning ordinance. Id. at 62, 65-66, 500 A.2d at 391, 393 (Stein,
J., dissenting).
The predicament faced by the Gonchars is not uncommon
today. People are living longer and housing is becoming a major
concern for the elderly. Municipalities have a legitimate interest,
however, in maintaining residential areas and in dealing with the
problems created by additions to single-family dwellings. When
first erected, such a structure may be intended for use only by
family members. Unfortunately, once the original house is sold,
the addition may serve different purposes. Although the
Northvale ordinance was imperfectly drafted, it was essentially a
fair and reasonable means of preserving single-family residential
areas. Therefore, the supreme court correctly upheld the municipality's right to maintain the integrity of its housing patterns.
Maria A. Wuss
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SELECTION-TRIAL COURT DID

NOT IMPERMISSIBLY CURTAIL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY IMPANELING ONLY THIR-

JURORS-State v. Brunson, 101 N.J. 132, 501 A.2d 145
(1985).

TEEN

Lawrence Brunson was indicted on two counts of sexual assault and one count of kidnaping. New Jersey law entitled the
state to twelve peremptory challenges and the defendant to
twenty challenges in the course of selecting a jury. 101 N.J. at
134, 135, 501 A.2d at 145, 146. The trial court deviated from the
customary method of allowing peremptory challenges on a onefor-one basis and stipulated that "for the first eight sets of challenges" the state would assert the first challenge and the defense
would then be required to exercise the next two successive challenges. As a result of this procedure, each side would have the
same number of challenges remaining after the initial eight sets
of challenges. Brunson's counsel objected, arguing that the
court's chosen procedure was inconsistent with New Jersey's
court rules and that his client's right to maintain a numerical advantage in "the final stages of jury selection" had been circumvented. The trial judge rejected these arguments. Id. at 135, 501
A.2d at 146.
Prior to selection of the jury, the trial court also announced
that it intended to impanel sixteen jurors. Before all the peremptory challenges could be exercised, however, the jury pool was
exhausted. As a result, when the defense asserted its last three
peremptory challenges and reduced the panel to thirteen, no
pool members were available to complete the jury. Id. at 136,
501 A.2d at 146-47. The trial judge then decided to begin the
trial with only thirteen jurors. The defense maintained that it had
exercised its peremptory challenges on the assumption that sixteen jurors would be chosen. Therefore, the defense asserted,
the court's failure to replace the final three jurors had effectively
deprived his client of the right to exercise three peremptory challenges. Brunson's attorney claimed that a mistrial had occurred.
Alternatively, he sought an adjournment until more jurors could
be pooled. The trial court denied both motions. Id. at 136, 501
A.2d at 147.
Brunson was subsequently convicted on all three charges.
The appellate division affirmed the conviction in an unpublished
opinion. The New Jersey Supreme Court then granted certifica-
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tion and upheld the judgment of the appellate court. Id. at 13435, 501 A.2d at 146.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stein first acknowledged that the right to peremptory challenges was intended to
benefit the defendant by ensuring a fair and impartial jury.
Although it was guaranteed by neither the state nor the Federal
constitution, it was nonetheless "a right with deep historic
roots." Id. at 136-37, 501 A.2d at 147. The court also noted that
peremptory challenges were widely used in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 143, 501 A.2d at 150. Therefore, Justice Stein observed,
the issue before the court was whether the defendant's substantial right of peremptory challenge had been prejudicially impaired by the trial court's adoption of the one-for-two challenge
procedure. Id. at 143-44, 501 A.2d at 151.
Justice Stein recognized that New Jersey law provides the defendant with a numerical advantage. Nonetheless, he reasoned,
this advantage does not automatically extend to the final stages
ofjury selection because the prosecution may refrain from exercising its peremptory challenges in the early rounds. Id. at 144,
501 A.2d at 151. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial
court's procedure had "not impermissibly curtail[ed]" the defendant's "full exercise of his right to challenge jurors peremptorily." Id. at 145, 501 A.2d at 151. In an effort to avoid further
controversy, however, the court urged the state's criminal practice committee to implement a standardized procedure for the
exercise of peremptory challenges and instructed trial courts to
adhere to the customary method of alternating the challenges on
a one-for-one basis. Id., 501 A.2d at 151-52.
Justice Stein also rejected the argument that the impaneling
of only thirteen jurors had unfairly diluted the defendant's right
to exercise peremptory challenges. The court stressed that a defendant has a right to be tried by twelve jurors; any jurors impaneled beyond the requisite number serve merely to ensure the
availability of twelve jurors to deliberate at the trial's end. Id. at
145-46, 501 A.2d at 152. Any dilution of the right to exercise
peremptory challenges, Justice Stein asserted, actually occurs in
the court's initial decision to impanel sixteen jurors. He maintained that such a dilution was authorized by New Jersey's court
rules, which expressly permit the trial judge to impanel additional jurors. Consequently, the court concluded, the defendant
had not been prejudiced by the subsequent reduction of the jury
panel. Id. at 146-47, 501 A.2d at 152.
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The Brunson court correctly emphasized that protection of a
defendant's right to peremptory challenges extends only to the
defendant's ability to exercise those challenges and not to the
sequence in which they are exercised. In restraining lower courts
from deviating from the customary practice, however, the court
places an unfair restriction upon a trial judge's use of discretion
in appropriate circumstances. The criminal practice committee
should accept the "challenge" and should resolve the tension between judicial discretion and a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial by clarifying the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. One possible solution would be to provide the prosecution and the defense with an equal number of
challenges at the outset.
Terence Sweeney

EVIDENCE-PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-AUTOMATIC IN CAMERA INSPECTION NOT WARRANTED IN WEIGHING STATE'S INTEREST IN CONFIDENTIALITY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT OF

ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS-Loigman

v. Kimmelman, 102 NJ.

98, 505 A.2d 958 (1986).
In an attempt to investigate the Monmouth County Prosecutor's use of confidential, petty-cash, and confiscated-monies accounts, Larry S. Loigman, a practicing attorney in Monmouth
County, requested a copy of the attorney general's audit of these
accounts. Funds from these accounts are used by the prosecutor
to perform "sensitive law-enforcement functions," such as conducting undercover operations and rewarding informers. The attorney general refused to surrender the material, claiming that
the audit was part of a confidential internal investigation and was
privileged from disclosure. 102 NJ. at 101, 505 A.2d at 960.
Loigman brought suit in the superior court in an attempt to
compel the attorney general to turn over the material. Id.
Loigman asserted that he had a right of access to the information
under New Jersey's Right to Know Law, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 47:1A-1 to -4 (West 1985), which permits any citizen to in-

spect documents that are a matter of public record without dem-
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onstrating standing or any particular need for the information.
102 N.J. at 101, 505 A.2d at 960. The attorney general moved
for summary judgment, alleging that the documents were not
"public records" under the statute because they were not "required by law to be maintained or kept on file." Id. at 101-02,
505 A.2d at 960. At oral argument on the motion, Loigman asserted for the first time a common law right of access to the information. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on both the statutory and the common law
grounds. Id. at 102, 505 A.2d at 960.
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the lower court's
holding that the documents were not "public records" under the
Right to Know Law, but held that Loigman had a right of access
under the common law. Id. The appellate court remanded the
case and instructed the trial court to decide whether the materials
were public records under the common law and, if so, to review
the documents in camera to determine whether they should remain confidential or be made available for inspection. Id., 505
A.2d at 961. The supreme court granted certification to consider
"whether the Appellate Division opinion calls for an automatic in
camera review at the request of any claimant alleging citizen status, no matter how confidential the material" may be. Id. at 103,
505 A.2d at 961.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern affirmed the
decision of the appellate division. Id. at 114, 505 A.2d at 967.
The court noted that the general rule is that a person need establish only citizen status and that he is seeking the information
in good faith in order to warrant the production of public
records. Id. at 104, 505 A.2d at 962. Nevertheless, access to
public records may be limited, Justice O'Hern asserted, when the
need for confidentiality outweighs the citizen's interest in disclosure. Id. at 105, 505 A.2d at 962. In determining whether a person should have access to public records, the court ruled that a
trial judge must balance the individual's interest in acquiring the
material against the state's need to keep the information secret.
Id. at 106, 505 A.2d at 963.
Addressing the issue of whether an automatic in camera review is warranted whenever a trial judge applies this balancing
test, Justice O'Hern noted that such a review creates a dilemmathe in camera inspection itself might adversely impair the state's
legitimate interest in confidentiality. Id. at 108, 505 A.2d at 964.
Reasoning that disclosure of some information, even to a judge,

910

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

might discourage informers from coming forward or inhibit "the
flow of ideas [among] legislative policymakers," the court concluded that "a right to automatic in camera inspection is not warranted." Id. at 108-09, 505 A.2d at 964. Instead, the court
mandated a two-step process. As part of this process, the court
noted, the state must classify and index the material sought,
specifying the particular reasons for confidentiality. Id. at 109,
505 A.2d at 964-65. After evaluating the detailed description
furnished by the state and weighing the countervailing interest of
the party seeking disclosure, Justice O'Hern observed, the trial
court must determine whether the document-production issue
can be resolved with or without an in camera review. Id. at 112-13,
505 A.2d at 966. He noted, for example, that a state-prepared
index may indicate that the documents contain evidence of official misconduct, thus warranting an inspection by the trial judge.
Id. at 113, 505 A.2d at 966. In conclusion, Justice O'Hern suggested that the state legislature conclusively resolve the question
of the scope of a citizen's access to public records. Id. at 114,
505 A.2d at 967.
In its decision, the Loigman court acknowledged the importance of the individual's right of access to public records. It also
recognized that to safeguard this right from conclusory claims of
confidentiality by the state, a trial judge may need to conduct an
in camera review of the documents in question. The court's primary concern, however, was with the potential impairment to the
state's legitimate interests inherent in such a review. By mandating a two-step procedure rather than an automatic review, the
court attempted to eliminate the possibility of irreparable damage to the government's permissible confidential operations. It
remains to be seen whether the procedure devised by the court
will prove sufficiently flexible to protect both the state's interest
in confidentiality and the individual's right to know.
Scott N. Rubin

